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In April 2014, nineteen years after the Dayton Accords signed Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) into statehood, the first “Bosnian"1 was born. Faruk Salaka was still just a baby when he
became a profound symbol of the nation’s reckoning with its hegemonic2 policies of
ethnonationalism and separation that permeate nearly all aspects of contemporary life. The child
of Bosnian Muslims3 Kemal and Elvira Salaka, Faruk was expected to be registered as a
Bosniak, one of BiH’s three officially recognized constituent ethnic and national groups (the
other two being Croats and Serbs). Faruk’s parents however, decided to fight to register their son
as “Bosnian” in an unprecedented act of “patriotism.”4 Paradoxically, in Bosnia there is no
“Bosnian” national group or people, as nationhood is associated solely with ethnic identity. Thus,
there is no one unifying national Bosnian identity, but rather three exclusive ones (Croats, Serbs,
and Muslims). As Faruk’s father told the Balkan news agency BIRN: “I defended Bosnia and
Herzegovina from ethnic exclusivity when Serbs were doing that. Now when Bosniaks are doing
the same, I have to fight. Is it possible that we who were born in Bosnia do not have anything in
common?”5 But, in Bosnia-Herzegovina–a country plagued by the memories of Yugoslavia’s
bloody fragmentation–division, not unity, has been the status quo for nearly thirty years.

1 All

citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are “Bosnians” in the sense that they are members of the Bosnian state, and
I will use the term Bosnian to refer to citizens of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the paper (Croats,
Serbs, and Muslims alike).
I use this term (hegemonic and hegemony) to denote the way in which ethnonational identity permeates and
dictates social and political dynamics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The potency and legitimization of ethnonational
identity has made it an established order of categorization that keeps Croats and Bosniaks divided, both physically
discursively.
2
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Hereto referred to as Bosniaks.

Elvira M. Jukic, “Bosnian Baby Beats Ethnically Divided System,” BIRN, February 16, 2015. https://
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Bosnia is a country defined by profound internal boundaries. Ravaged by war between
1992 and 1995 (when Yugoslavia collapsed), the Yugoslav identity that had been employed to
unify the nation violently fragmented along ethnic lines, as Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks took up
arms against one another. Each group envisioned their own independent state emerging in the
wake of Tito’s Yugoslavia, and war-mongering ethnic elites harnessed ethnonational identity as
both a rallying cry and cause for persecution of the proclaimed “other.” Peace finally came to the
small and beleaguered former Yugoslav republic in the form of the Dayton Accords.
Brokered by the Clinton administration and implemented by the UN, the peace deal
created one country with three entities: The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina6, whose
residents are mainly Bosniaks with a large Croat minority; Republika Srpska, whose population
is almost entirely Serb; and Brcko, a self-governing, ethnically mixed city in the northeast.
Together, these three comprise the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina; however, this paper focuses
on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Republika Srpska is much more ethnically
homogenous. Its dominant Serb ethnic identity is more reminiscent of a unifying national
identity, and its institutions more centralized. Each entity (the Republika and Federation) has its
own institutions and legislative bodies, and the Federation is divided into cantons, each with its
own administrations and governing bodies (in territorial terms, Republika Srpska occupies 49%
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation occupies 51%). The central institutions of the State of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as the rotating tripartite presidency and parliament, are relatively
weak,7 and the prevailing hegemony of the OHR (Office of the High Representative, appointed
Like Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, the Federation is frequently referred to as BiH. For the purposes of this
paper, I will be examining the Federation and frequently referring to it as BiH and Bosnia.
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“Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Britannica, accessed December 16, 2021, https:/www.britannica.com/place/Bosniaand-Herzegovina/Government-and-society.
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by the UN) over the Bosnian government(s) considerably limits the country’s sovereignty,
resigning it to the status of a near-international-protectorate.
The political and jurisdictional framework of separation exacerbates and is in turn
exacerbated by the institutionalization and potency of ethnic identity in BiH. In many ways, this
can be traced back to the Dayton Accords which, with the aim of ending a violent war that was
fought along ethnic lines, essentially separated the combatants–Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. A
key element of the approach taken by the Accords, however, was the inherent–and emphatic–
recognition of ethnic division as a legitimate, even necessary, institution, and the Accords
simultaneously worked ethnic separation into the constitutional fibre of the new Bosnian state.8
Thus, through war and international intervention, the citizens of Bosnia found themselves in a
new system that essentially forced (and forces) them to embrace their now entirely unilateral
Croat, Serb, or Bosniak identity. As such, one’s ethnonational identity remains incredibly
relevant. The resulting ethnic factionalism permeates politics and Bosnian society as well.
Given the painful memories of the ethnonational fervor that led neighbors to take up arms
against one another across Bosnia in the early 1990s, ethnonationalism has remained a wedge
driven through contemporary Bosnian society. Additionally, the continued acceptance and
normalcy of ethnic division keeps alive the very sentiments that contributed to the outbreak of
the Bosnian war in 1992. The country was itself born of fighting that occurred specifically along
ethnic lines, and the Bosnian social fabric that was torn apart has never been truly repaired. The
resulting social paralysis, where ethnic integration has continually failed to succeed, is
accompanied by an equally devastating political and economic paralysis, where politics continue
“Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Human Rights Library, University of
Minnesota, accessed December 16, 2021. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/icty/dayton/daytonsum.html.
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to be dominated by ethnic partisanship and economic depression is widespread. Importantly,
these social cleavages and economic malaise are particularly perpetuated by the continued
potency of ethnicity, as well as that of the ethnocracy–the ruling of ethnonational elites and their
exclusive rhetoric.9 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnonational identity is–and, since 1992, has
been–the overarching determinant in the development of modern Bosnian state. This has turned
Bosnia’s transitional phase–that is, its charted path towards becoming a strong, independent
democracy suitable for admission to the E.U.–into one without end, a sort of sociopolitical
purgatory between a future of reconciliation, reconstruction and integration, and a past marked
by ethnic strife and profound disunity.
However, as the memories of the 1990s–memories that, for many Bosnians, justified the
divided landscape of their new state in 1995–drift further into the past, and the uniquely Bosnian
paralysis continues with no end in sight, dissatisfaction with the current situation has begun to
reach a tipping point, exemplified most notably during the February 2014 protests in Tuzla,
Mostar, Zenica, and Sarajevo, which turned violent. For the youngest generations that have
grown up in what has come to be referred to as post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
stagnation of the economy, (perceived) increasingly illegitimate yet rigid ethnic segregation,10
and corrupt and paralyzed ethnic politics are all they have ever known.

Sunčana Laketa, "The Politics of Landscape as Ways of Life in the 'divided' City: Reflections from Mostar, BosniaHerzegovina,” Space & Polity 23, no. 2 (2019), 171.
I also employ this term to refer to structures and policies of separation promoted by ethnonational elites and the
ethnofactionalism they engender.
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I use this term not in reference to racial segregation in America, where one group holds more privilege and power
than the other, but rather the way Bosnia has developed to be a state comprised of two parallel societies separated
along ethnic lines. They exist alongside one another but largely refrain from interacting as a singular, truly integrated
society.
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Bosnia’s youth is separated by age from the traumatic events of the 1990’s, yet live their
legacy day-to day simply by existing in a state structured around ethnonational identity. Growing
up in a post-war transitional state that has seemingly failed to reconcile Bosnia’s troubled past–
and adequately provide for its citizens–has put many young Bosnians in a position of conflict
with the ethnocracy, whose legitimacy is based in division and memory. Faruk Salaka’s parents
exemplify this, as their decision to register their son as “Bosnian” was a direct and conscious
effort to move beyond the rigid ethnic categorization that continues to anchor BiH to its past.
Young Bosnians increasingly perceive the status quo as unjustified absurdity, and have begun to
directly defy it. The distinctly youthful character of the resulting confrontation with the Bosnian
establishment is based in the paradox of youth’s disconnect from–yet entrapment by–a
nationalized memory of the 1990s–that legitimizes blatant social segregation. It is defined by
movement beyond the traditional discursive sphere of inter-ethnic relations and politics, as well
as the conscious and unconscious crossing of constitutionally established ethnic divisions.
Accordingly, young Bosnians are actively reimagining a unified and reconciliatory Bosnian state,
community, and identity.
This paper elaborates on ethnographic work that has been conducted since the early
2000s concerning the self-identification of youth in post-Dayton Bosnia, specifically with regard
to their perception of ethnic identity and BiH’s recent history, in order to examine the position of
Bosnian youth in the State’s developing social and political climate. Additionally, I employ
surveys, news articles, and scholarly essays that have emerged more recently–and that directly
examine the social, political, and economic development of the transitional Bosnian state–in
order to investigate the characteristics that distinctly pertain to the generations born after the
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Dayton Accords, as well as those who experienced the war as children. In conjunction with this, I
also seek to examine the way in which these young people have sought to reconcile and interact
with the divisive institutions that characterize the place they call home.
Life in post-Dayton BiH is characterized by divisions and categories, and for the
youngest generations this is particularly tangible as they intimately interact with ethnocratic
policies and structures on a daily basis. For example, in the aftermath of the Bosnian War, the socalled “two schools under one roof” system was established in the Federation11 in an effort to
separate Croat children from Bosniak children during the school day. Within this structure, two
different curricula are taught–in the respective, albeit nearly identical, languages of the two
respective ethnic groups–and each “school” has its own administration.12 Accordingly, Bosniak
and Croat schoolchildren tend to learn differing narratives about the war in the 1990s, itself part
of the greater debate over guilt that continues to take place across the entirety of the former
Yugoslavia.13 In the two schools system, ethnic identities are inherently naturalized, legitimized,
and stressed via a rigid system of segregation into which children are socialized, as well as
through the nationalized curricula they study. As of 2018, 56 schools remained in BiH that
adhered to this structure,14 16 years after the IC (international community) in Bosnia began its

Republika Srpska is considerably more homogenous (Serb) than the Federation, whose citizens are primarily
Bosniaks and has a large Croat minority (30%???).
11

12

Monika Palmberger, How Generations Remember (Basingstoke: Springer, 2016), 93-97.

These narratives tend to emphasize the victimhood of the respective group learning it, while emphasizing the guilt
of the other group.
13

OSCE, “OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina launches report on ‘two schools under one roof’ concept as
most visible example of discrimination in education,” December 3, 2018, accessed December 16, 2021, https://
www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/.
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attempts to integrate schools as a mechanism for unified state-building.15 Given the amount of
time that children spend in school, youth interact directly and immersively with the ethnocracy
and its policies of division through the ethnic categorization maintained by the two schools
system. The ethnocracy directly injects itself into the lives of schoolchildren by separating them
in accordance with their ethnonational identity from the moment they begin school.
Moving beyond the social sphere, the segregationist16 policies of ethnocratic hegemony
have, from the onset of Yugoslavia’s collapse in the early 1990s, been accompanied by economic
malaise, creating what Fritsch and Puljek-Shank term “dual hegemony:”17 a dynamic where the
two forces dominate the development of the Bosnian state. As Kurtovic notes, Dayton has “been
a protracted – if not hidden from view–postsocialist economic transformation.”18 In addition to
implementing a “consociational model of power sharing” explicitly along ethnic lines, the
Accords took on the reconstruction of Bosnia’s economy,19 which was already in transition away
from Yugoslavia’s socialist model when the war broke out in 1992. As such, the chaos of
liberalization so emblematic of the immediate post-Soviet era and space was compounded by the
destruction of war. The cannibalization of factories and industries became frequent as political
and economic interests were merged via black markets that took shape during the war, and as

15 Azra

Hromadzic, "Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar
Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Comparative Education Review 52, no. 4 (2008): 544.
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See footnote 9.

Felix Fritsch and R.J. Puljek-Shank, "Activism in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Struggles against Dual Hegemony and the
Emergence of ‘Local First’," East European Politics and Societies 33, no. 1 (2019), 135.
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elites began preparing for the capitalist future that was in sight.20 Naturally, BiH came into being
as an ethnically heterogenous state coming down from the fervor and trauma of ethnic war, its
economy in tatters. The hegemony of ethnocratic rhetoric and policies have failed to address
either of these core problems.The economy has never fully recovered, and the State has never
truly unified. Because of this, the post-Yugoslavs of BiH have grown up in a state characterized
by grinding poverty and economic depression, made all the more difficult to rectify by a
stagnating political sphere dictated by ethnonational allegiances.
For a youth that has only ever experienced a post-war state in endless transition, the dual
hegemony is often experienced on the personal level as economic and political paralysis, as well
as profound inequity. Unemployment in BiH is currently a staggering 27%, and for youth it is an
astronomical 60%.21 Two thirds of the population below the age of 30 wish to emigrate.22 While
Bosnia is one of the poorest countries in Europe, its politicians are the highest paid in
comparison to the local average wage, and the wealthiest 85 individuals have fortunes that equal
50% of the GDP.23 Though one would go too far by saying that BiH is a country without hope, it
is certainly lacking–and pessimism characterizes the youngest generation’s attitudes towards
their country. In 2014, the OSCE conducted a survey in BiH–titled The Silent Majority Speaks–
with the aim of analyzing the population’s opinions and general outlook. As its surveys with
youth focus groups found, “there is a sense of exclusion, especially by the actions of older
20

Kurtovic, “Who Sows Hunger,” 643.
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Kurtovic, 644.

UNDP, “Executive Summary of Main Findings.” The Silent Majority Speaks. July 11, 2014, accessed December
16, 2021, https://www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/library/democratic_governance/thesilent-majority-speaks.html, page 2.
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Jasmin Mujanovic, “The evolution of Bosnia’s protest movement: an interview with Jasmin Mujanovic,”
interview by Heather McRobie, openDemocracy, May 7, 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/evolutionof-bosnias-protest-movement-interview-with-jasmin-m/.
23

Roge 10
people. Young people seem to feel that potentially they could make a difference but that in reality
they have no real effect,”24 as “the relationship between young voters and elected representatives
appears to be characterized by mistrust and low efficacy. Politics does not emerge as an arena
where young BiH citizens feel they can realize their aspirations and make their voices heard.”25
In summary, young Bosnians have grown up in a state that has failed to deliver the end of postwar transition espoused in the Dayton Accords. Instead they find themselves trapped in political
and economic gridlock, and young people feel powerless to forge the future they desire.
Youth discontent is compounded by post-Yugoslavs’ disconnect with the traumatic events
of the 1990’s, events that were–contrastingly–experienced directly by Bosnia’s older generations.
In her quasi-ethnographic book, How Generations Remember, Monika Palmberger explores the
way in which the memories of Yugoslavia and its collapse are encountered and confronted across
three generations: the First Yugoslavs (young adults during the formation of Yugoslavia after the
Second World War), the Last Yugoslavs (adults during the collapse of Yugoslavia), and the postYugoslavs26 (children during the 1990s or born shortly after). Palmberger conducted her research
in Mostar, and frames the city as a microcosm. This is effective, as Mostar–an ethnically mixed
city during the Yugoslav era–became rigidly separated with the outbreak of war in 1992. All
aspects of life fragmented along ethnic lines as a product of the vicious fighting that took place
in and around the city. Croat and Bosniak schoolchildren ceased to attend school together, and
the river that runs through the city became–and still is–a de facto border between the two ethnic
24

UNDP, “Executive Summary,” 109.
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UNDP, “Executive Summary,” 115.

Palmberger defines the post-Yugoslavs as those who were children during the Bosnian War, and thus spent most
of their life in the post-Dayton Bosnian state. For the purposes of this paper, I use the term post-Yugoslavs to refer to
all Bosnians born after the war, as well as those who were children during it.
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groups, with Croats on the West side and Bosniaks on the East side. Since the implementation of
the Dayton Accords in 1995, this separation has remained the status quo and has become further
institutionalized. The two schools system is the norm in Mostar, and has perpetuated segregation
among the youth, as well as the nationalization of education.
Palmberger’s findings show that, for each generation, the collapse of Yugoslavia holds
different significance, largely a product of how old they were when the war began. For the Last
Yugoslavs (frequently the parents of post-Yugoslavs), the war is a directly experienced cosmic
event in their lives. One of Palmberger’s interviewees, Minela, for example, biographically
structures her life as “before the war,” or “after the war.” As Palmberger points out, Minela does
“not refer to the time before the war as the time when she was a child, but divided her life neatly
around the rupture of the war.”27 The post-Yugoslavs, on the other hand, experienced the war at a
very young age–at a time when they were incapable of truly understanding the events that
unfolded around them–if they were alive yet to experience it at all. Particularly for those born
after the war, Palmberger found that post-Yugoslavs tend to dissociate from the war experience,28
as they either experienced it as less of a “biographical rupture”29 than their parents, or simply did
not experience it at all. As such, the war that created the Bosnian state in which young people
live is much like a specter. It is invisible–banished to the past–yet ever present in the high levels
of “mistrust”30 that pervade Bosnian society and the continuation of war-time segregation. It
remains active in the country’s ethnocratic institutions, such as the “two schools under one roof”
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Palmberger, Generations, 178.
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Palmberger, 203.
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Palmberger, 165.
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UNDP, 37.
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system, and in the stories or charged silences concerning the past that Bosnian youth receive
from the older generations.31
This positions the post-Yugoslavs differently than the older generations within the
landscape of memory and ethnic rifts that defines BiH. As Palmberger communicates in her
findings, the youngest generations tend to “distance themselves from the nationalized discourses
of victimization.”32 These discourses harken back to the Bosnian War, when Bosniaks, Croats,
and Serbs fought each other, and are frequently employed by political elites when justifying the
continued ethnic separation endemic to Bosnian society. Simply put, the war and its traumatic
hemorrhaging of Bosnian society is far less personal for post-Yugoslavs. As Leijla, a 16 year old
Bosniak admits, “It is for sure easier for us than for our parents, because they are familiar with
everything, with the situation that led to war and everything else, while we were protected from
everything; we were just facing some consequences of the war.”33 Here, Leijla makes the
interesting choice to refer to the collective youth of Mostar as “we.”34 However, Bosniak and
Croat youth frequently adhere to the rigid structures of segregation that permeate Mostar’s
physical and social landscape in their daily lives.35 Or, they are left without a choice, as when
attending school. Thus, it is significant that Palmberger’s interviewee still appears to see the
identity of youth as superseding that of ethnicity. As Leijla explains, it is largely in part because
the older generations lived the history that created Bosnia as it is today. To the younger
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Palmberger, 237-238.
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Palmberger, 207.
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generations, it is just that: history. Despite this disconnect, the past is very much so ingrained in
the Bosnian present, and for Croat and Bosniak youth, daily life is characterized by structures of
segregation–such as the de facto border of the river in Mostar–directly tied to the memories of
the war in the 1990s. In this sense, the post-Yugoslavs live within a projection of memory they
cannot directly relate to, and the war remains a proverbial elephant in the room.
In conjunction with their disconnect with nationalized memory, the daily experience of
paralysis and interaction with ethnonational institutions generates a distinctly youthful friction
between young people and the ethnocracy. Natasa Garic-Humphrey fittingly terms the youngest
generation in BiH as the “absurdistan generation,” as “they often say they live in Absurdistan,”36
a phrase coined to express frustration with “a place that is so ridiculous it is hard to believe it
exists in real life.”37 Young Bosnians have grown up in a state where all they have ever known is
an inefficient and corrupt government, weak central institutions, profound inequality, and the
hegemonic division of society along ethnic lines. As such, and in contrast to their elders, their
sole frame of reference for the endless transition in which they find themselves is the
consequences they suffer daily, not the war or Dayton Accords that catalyzed the transition.
According to The Silent Majority Speaks, “young people feel held back by intergenerational
conflict, the authorities and the media.”38 In her piece on intergenerational dynamics during the
2014 protests in Sarajevo, Garic-Humphrey interviews Jasmina, a young activist, who says,
the elders obviously have no clue how it is to grow up in this dump…at least they experienced better days under
socialism that perhaps was not fabulous but was definitely much better than this post Dayton crazy place that
Nataša Garić-Humphrey, "Negotiating “True” Politics: Intergenerational Dynamics During Social Uprising in
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Political and Legal Anthropology Review 43, no. 1 (2020), 73.
36
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everybody wants to run away from…at least in times of socialism, people had something to look forward to. Today
we have nothing.39

What Jasmina expresses is telling in a variety of ways. First, she turns to the Yugoslav past as an
example of when things were good in BiH, at least better than they are presently. Secondly, she
directly addresses one of the key differences between generations in reckoning with the Bosnian
situation: that the young people have only ever known a transitional Bosnia, whereas the older
generations experienced Yugoslavia, its collapse and subsequent outbreak of war, and the
creation of a transitional state. For the youngest generations, the ethnocracy is abstract but
hegemonic, and young people tend to harbor quite polarized and disillusioned frustration with
the ethnonationalist policies that continue to divide and paralyze the country.
Generally speaking, there is considerable resignation on the part of the Bosnian
population–Croats and Bosniaks alike, and regardless of age–in adhering to the structures and
institutions in place that support ethnocratic rule and contribute to stagnation. As “The Silent
Majority Speaks” found in 2014, there is “reluctance by a large minority to let go of ethnic
politics, and the powerful idea that politicians and government rather than the people should be
in charge of change.”40 This is in spite of the fact that common opinion in Bosnia declares that a
united state and nation would be best.41 It is also in spite of common mistrust of political
structures.42 In BiH, there is a widespread, albeit frequently resentful, acceptance of the statusquo, and thus a chronic lack–but not complete absence of–grassroots political activism. Despite–
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or perhaps because of–this apparent reluctance to engage in political activity that could initiate
constitutional and institutional change, the friction between Bosnian youth and the ethnocracy
manifests itself in the myriad of ways in which young people have countered the hegemony of
stagnation, both consciously and unconsciously.
A profound case of Bosnian youth directly countering the divisive structures of the
Bosnian state’s ethnocratic institutions can be seen in schools. As mentioned earlier in this paper,
the “two schools under one roof” system became commonplace throughout Federation in the
immediate aftermath of the Dayton Accords, when the war in Bosnia ended. Having just a year
earlier been at war, Croats and Bosniaks were constitutionally reunited via the creation of the
Bosniak-Croat Federation. As elaborated on above, the peace and unification brought by the
Dayton Accords was based on a “consociational power-sharing model” promoted by the IC that
has legitimized and institutionalized ethnic divisions within BiH. In other words, the IC’s statebuilding strategy is based in the separation of nations within the Bosnian state.43 During the
Bosnian War, the education system quickly fragmented along ethnic lines, and this fragmentation
was further institutionalized and legitimized by the Dayton Accords as a mechanism of its
consociational power sharing strategy.44
Under the “two schools” system, exclusive identities–namely ethnicity–are heavily
emphasized. Curricula in the two schools system are nationalized and work to reinforce the

43 Azra

Hromadzic, "Bathroom Mixing: Youth Negotiate Democratization in Postconflict Bosnia and Herzegovina,”
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 34, no. 2 (2011), 271.
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Hromadzic, “Discourses of Integration,” 544.
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imagined communities45 of each respective ethnonational group.46 Thus, schools are a frequent
channel through which nationalized and exclusive rhetoric purported by ethnic elites is
communicated to youth. The administrative, linguistic, and physical separation that forms the
basis of the “two schools” system creates a sort of DMZ between Croat and Bosniak
schoolchildren. Whether they share the building but occupy different sides, or alternate
classroom time in the morning and afternoon, students develop and grow in an environment
constructed around rigidly separated coexistence. Even the 2004 “reunification” of the Mostar
Gymnasium–the first school to reunify–only merged administrations.47 Beyond that, it has been
incapable of overcoming the policies of division so ingrained in the Bosnian school system, as
the structures of linguistic and physical separation–which began during the war–have persisted
via homogenous classrooms and nationalized curricula. This normalized separation actively
resists the IC’s goal of unified state building in BiH. As a teacher at the Mostar Gymnasium says:
“if a child learns in the elementary school that Croats go here and Bosniaks go there, and if that
continues, unfortunately, in high school, and at the university…I think we will create degenerate

In his 1983 book Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson defines “imagined communities” as an integral part
of the creation of the first European nation states and nationalism. With the advent of widespread print media,
individuals became capable of absorbing rhetoric and conceptualizing a national identity much larger than their local
identity. According to Anderson, these communities that became the basis for nationhood are imagined because even
citizens of the smallest nations do not, and will never know, all of their countrymen. While such rhetoric and
ideologies that allowed for this imagination functioned horizontally, bringing people together under a single flag, the
dispersion of rhetoric and ideology was vertical, conceptualized by elites and intellectuals. I use the term “imagined
communities” in a similar sense, referring to the perceived supra-national Croat identity (ethnic Croats being in
Croatia and BiH) as well as the Bosniak identity unique to BiH, that re-emerged as the imagined Yugoslav national
community fell apart in 1992. Both identities (Bosniak and Croatian) are unilateral and, in the contemporary
Bosnian context, draw on heavily nationalized memories of the wars in the 1990s, providing a history that is both
unifying for, and exclusive to each ethnic group. In line with Anderson’s definition, a Bosniak or Croat does not
know all other members of their ethnic group, however self-identification with an ethnic group is inescapable in
BiH, and exclusively positions an individual within an abstract, impersonal national community, while
simultaneously alienating the “other.”
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[degeneracy in the youth] young people who will not be ready to be creative members of any
society.”48
Despite the apparent failure of “reunification” (at least in the common sense of the word)
at the Mostar Gymnasium, youth have found a way to directly, yet unconsciously, challenge the
segregated structure of schooling in Bosnia and, by proxy, the hegemony of the ethnocracy. This
tends to occur in the bathroom, of all places. In 2006, Azra Hromadzic conducted 9 months of
ethnographic research at the Mostar Gymnasium, and her findings portray a Bosnian youth that
appears to be turning away from the ethnic politics that dominate the Bosnian sociopolitical
sphere. At the Mostar Gymnasium, the bathroom has emerged as a space “that enables
experimentation with ethno-religious [and ethno-national] identity,” while students can share a
common activity that defies authority and the “academic architecture”: smoking cigarettes.49
Inter-ethnic intermingling only happens during passing periods in the bathroom and never in the
classroom (since classrooms are ethnically homogeneous),50 thus the bathroom emerges as a
limited yet impactful space for what appears to be an unconscious challenging of ethnocratic
policies that promote separation. It is unconscious in the sense that students are driven by an
adolescent, social desire to “mingle” and explore the unknown, rather than by ambitions of
creating a national identity that defies the status quo. However, they inherently do challenge the
status quo, because such intermingling is politicized in the ethnocratic state.
Students feel that the bathroom is the only legitimate space in which to meet “other”
students, even if they strongly desire to do so in other spaces. According to Hromadzic’s work,
48
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many students who do not smoke are willing to endure the suffocating air of a carcinogen-filled
bathroom just to meet other students and “hang out with them.”51 One student that Hromadzic
interviews says: “I cannot just go to their classrooms and say: ‘Here I am,’” and then proceeds to
ask Hromadzic to introduce him “to the guys from IV-c.”52 Within the more exposed spaces of
the school and beyond, such as the public spaces of Mostar, mixing is not a reality. Hromadzic
notes how she experienced a “mixed” mass of 300 students leave the Gymnasium, and
immediately split into two distinct and separated groups.53 It is only when given a more private
and, paradoxically, exclusive space like the bathroom that students are able to cross the fault
lines of ethnonational and ethnoreligious identity, if only for a short while.
However, even in the bathroom the divisions that dominate the public spaces within and
outside of the school can manifest themselves in the form of graffiti such as the Ustasha symbol,
a loaded historical emblem used by the Croatian Nazi puppet state, or frequently soccer teams
like the Bosniak “Red Army” and the Croat “Ultras.”54 This evidences the apparent, and
expected, incompleteness of “bathroom mixing.” Students do not rewrite the history or
constitution of BiH in the restrooms of the Mostar Gymnasium (nor do they seek to), but they do
create their own space–quintessentially youthful in its rejection of authority via smoking–in
which they can at least begin to reimagine the Bosnian community and national identity.
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The dynamic of bathroom mixing appears to be even more profound and suggestive of a
youth willing to pursue the construction of a unified and reconciliatory Bosnian state when it is
viewed within greater context of debate over integration in Bosnia’s school system. As
Hromadzic eloquently states, “the educational system in BiH reflects the consequences of the
destruction of the war, the paradoxes of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and the weaknesses of the
BiH constitution(s).”55 The two schools system inherently naturalizes ethnic sentiment and
encourages the development of Croats and Bosniaks as two distinct and incompatible peoples.
Bosnia can be understood as a nation of external national minorities– ethnic groups that reside
outside of the nation and state in which most who share that ethnic identity reside. When calls for
the integration of schools under a unified curriculum came from the IC in the early 2000s, this
evidenced itself. Croats are the minority in Bosnia, and while Bosniaks largely accepted and
supported calls for integration, “the local [Mostar] Croat political community bordered on the
‘hysterical’… calling the Croat representatives who agreed to integration ‘traitors of the nation’
if they support the project.”56 By and large, “integration was understood as the forced
incorporation and assimilation of the Croat population into a seemingly equal power-sharing
pluralist BiH state, which, for most Croats, is experienced as one of Bosniak hegemony,”57 at
least politically speaking. The Croat political leadership in Mostar envisioned the city as a sort of
corridor between the Croatian external national minority in BiH, and the Croatian homeland.58
As such, they were utterly opposed to even the OSCE’s ideas for less far-reaching integration.
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With a discourse on unification that quickly took on such a rigid, ethnonational character
oriented around the protection of imagined ethnonational and religious communities, it is
remarkable that bathroom mixing occurs, and it highlights the generational differences in the
perception of Bosnian identity. Clearly, the Croat political community felt strong ties to the
Croatian state, seeing themselves as Croatian rather than Bosnian in terms of both nationality and
citizenship. This identification with a long-imagined historical Croat community was (and is)
certainly exacerbated by a minority status in Bosnia, and led many Croats to see the Mostar
Gymnasium as a sort of front line in the battle for the survival of Croatian national minority in
BiH. Students, on the other hand, who actually spend their days in the school, repeatedly, yet
unconsciously, move beyond the limitations of this exclusive discourse when taking part in
“bathroom mixing.”
While the phenomenon of graffiti does entail the Ustasha symbol, the more frequent use
of soccer logos seems to communicate that youth interpret ethnic “otherness” in more
contemporary and less loaded terms. It is defined by the ethnocratic state into which they have
been socialized, rather than by the history of an imagined homogenous national community and a
war that turned “others” into existential enemies. After all, sports rivalry–though certainly
polarizing–has a much more playful and competitive–but also unifying–connotation to it. While
you may belong to different teams, you can share the common ground of playing the same game.
As Hromadzic shows in her work, this idea of “otherness” is sometimes even a source of humor
for youth. She writes that, while smoking in the bathroom, a student asks Amna (a Bosniak girl)
“Amna, would you ever marry a Croat?” Amna replies “Sure, but he would need to convert to
Islam first.” Damjan (a Croat boy) then interjects “No problem, teach me some verses from the
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Koran.” When Hromadzic points out that Marijan (a Croat boy) “said yesterday that he would
marry a Muslim girl,” Marijan replies “Sure but only if she is infertile.” Everyone laughs, and
“Amna and Marijan hug tenderly.”59
While the Croat political community (presumably adults) viewed ethnic distinctions as a
zero sum game when addressing calls for integration, students actually integrate in their own
way and space, apparently recognizing ethnic divisions to be the very real systemic force that
they are, but not as absolute as their elders deem them to be. The language of instruction, for
example, was long a source of friction between Bosniaks and Croats during discourses on
integration. However, as Palmberger writes in reference to Carolynne Ashton’s survey work on
the Mostar Gymnasium:
The Gymnasium Mostar students interviewed had moved over three years [2006-2009] from support of separate
languages to believing that language was a ‘silly’ thing to be fighting over. This did not happen because they were
forced to integrate language in school, but because they made contact with each other and, over time, began to
accept each other’s language.60

She continues that “the fears come more from the parents than the students.”61 Clearly, the
mingling brought about by “bathroom mixing” has slowly but surely chipped away at
purportedly exclusive distinctions between Croats and Bosniaks, such as language.
Youth dynamics in the bathrooms of Mostar’s schools demonstrate the ability and
tendency of young people to unconsciously move beyond the ethnocratic structures of ethnic
exclusivity and division that permeate the Bosnian state, and create new discursive spaces for
imagining a new Bosnian identity. In doing this, youth actively challenge the status quo.
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However, they do this consciously as well, as shown by the protests that shook the nation in
February 2014. Beginning in the northern industrial town of Tuzla, protests spread to Mostar,
Zenica, and Sarajevo, and quickly turned violent.62 The protests themselves had economic roots:
workers from several privatized factories in Tuzla united over jobs, unpaid salaries, and
pensions. Soon, however, they were joined by students and local political activists.63 As the
hours passed by, cars were overturned, political offices and buildings were burned to the ground,
and stones and Molotov cocktails could be seen hurtling through the air while police and
protestors alike were injured.
The protests had two different dimensions. On the one hand they were prompted by
widespread anger and discontent with the dysfunctionality of the post-Dayton Bosnian State. On
the other, they emerged as a simultaneous and inevitable challenge to the war-time ethnic politics
that perpetuate such dysfunctionality. As elaborated on earlier in this paper, economic stagnation
was one of the two primary byproducts of the Dayton Accords, the other being the
institutionalization of ethnic politics and segregation (if one excludes peace). A largely
overlooked component of BiH’s transition as a post-conflict state was a catastrophic shift away
from socialism towards capitalism. This was marked by rampant corruption, clientelism, and
ethnic partisanship,64 and has brought crippling economic depression–even hunger–for most of
Bosnia’s citizens.
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Critical to understanding the protests and their profundity, it must be recognized that they
were not directed at ethnic politics and division, but rather at the economic malaise and systemic
dysfunctionality that have been perpetuated by ethnocratic institutions. However, the collective
suffering experienced by so many Bosnians emerged as an avenue towards questioning the
status-quo, as well as one towards the crossing of ethnic lines, during the protests. The popular
and emblematic protest slogan “we are hungry in three languages”65 eloquently and pointedly
demonstrated this. While the slogan recognizes the boundaries within Bosnian society
(language), it unifies them under hunger. Here, collective hardship supersedes prescribed
ethnonational identity, and this is reflected in the ethnically heterogeneous demographic of the
protests. The slogan becomes even more profound when one considers that language of academic
instruction became one of the main discursive battlegrounds during attempts at integration in
schools.
It was during the protests that youth operated within their own distinct, largely apolitical
space in order to challenged ethnic politics. In doing this, youth embodied the aforementioned
slogan in many ways. Looting and burning66 certainly did not turn Bosnia’s economic spiral
around, but it demonstrated the youth’s willingness to turn away from the system in order to
express their discontent with it, while the local plenums67 that followed in the weeks after found
more support from the older generations68 than the protests did. Additionally, this direct
challenge of the status-quo was highly conscious. Bosnians were (and are) dissatisfied with the
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condition of their state, and decided to protest in full view. The focus on “hunger” in slogans69
decisively cut across ethnic lines, focusing on the collectively experienced failure of ethnic
politics and transition, while the turn to violence directly contrasted the common disposition of
Bosnian citizens to accept the status quo and only rarely pursue avenues of grassroots political
activism.70 The destruction of political offices in particular speaks volumes to young Bosnian’s
cynical perception of their politicians. Rather than speak to political authorities, the protestors
called for their resignation and destroyed the physical spaces of their power. This perception was
grounded, as most politicians opted to sneak out of basement windows and flee to their BMWs,
rather than face the angry crowds demanding change.71
The violence that erupted at the protests was interpreted and presented by various media
outlets, politicians, and the public along a spectrum that reflected the generational differences in
memory examined extensively by Palmberger. These differences are well engendered by the
derogatory label “hooligan” ascribed to the presumably “young, rowdy, and immature
protestors” by certain media outlets.72 Kurtovic sums up the significance of this label and the
violence that served as grounds for its use: “The hooligans’ relative youth, immaturity and lack
of foresight divided the opinions of the public even further…Because their violent outburst had
turned the centre of Sarajevo into a war zone, their actions were equated with those of the
Serbian paramilitaries that twenty years earlier tried to shell the city into oblivion and
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submission.”73 The violence, especially at the hands of young people who were frequently
perceived as radical, looked all too familiar to those who experienced the three years of war in
the 1990s. However, the willingness of young people to turn to the distinctly apolitical sphere of
destructive protest is emblematic of how their position within nationalized memory and
disconnect with the 1990s allows them to move beyond the traditional ethnonational discourses
that dominate the Bosnian political sphere.
The use of the term “hooligan”74 also reflects an attempt by the Bosnian “establishment”
(to invoke a frequently employed term of protest discourse) to intentionally delegitimize and
subvert the apparent validity and urgency of the protests. “Hooligan” has a youthful connotation,
frequently associated with soccer fans in Europe, and it painted the protests to be the immature
rampages of children. Although a large minority certainly did take part in property damage and
looting, they were still voicing discontent with a regime that takes for itself and provides very
little. While the protests were initiated by workers, they gained impactful momentum when other
groups joined, one of the largest being young people and students.75 Additionally, the local
plenums that followed the protests took inspiration from those initiated by students at the
University of Tuzla in 2009, who sought to confront the corruption and oppression that was
commonplace at the university.76 The protests and plenums in 2014 were a moment when young
people emerged as a force capable of moving beyond the limitations for political action that
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promote complacency, especially among the older generations, in order to directly confront the
ethnocracy.
Indeed, it was the older generations that voiced the strongest disapproval for violence,
taking the stance of “the young people don’t know what we went through and fought for to make
the peace we have now.” In contrast, many young people, such as Jasmina, took a more positive
view, undoubtedly informed by their position in Bosnia’s landscape of nationalized memory, as
well as their experience of the dysfunctional transitional state. As Jasmina says,
I know the war was horrible. But, if they think we live in peace now, they are mistaken. You hear them say ‘anything
is better than shooting.’ But what does that mean? That we must bend our heads forever? Obey? Not say anything?
Just keep our mouths shut and go on with our miserable lives?77

Jasmina appears to see resignation to the status quo as a product of the fear of the past and what
strong, ethnically-aligned sentiments are capable of in BiH. Like many young people, however,
Jasmina is determined to break out of this prison of memory, even if it involves direct conflict
with the system. Garic-Humphrey describes this dynamic of generational variance well, writing
that
Elders and youth are both stuck in a conundrum of either trying to work the existing system to their advantage or
fight the mainstream political structure and risk losing what little opportunities they have in the first place. Elders
seem to be solving this problem more pragmatically by focusing on everyday socioeconomic concerns. Youth, on the
other hand, do not see Absurdistan as a place of opportunity but as one that is constraining their full potential.
Therefore, they lean on the side of “destroying” it.78

In terms of political action, the protests and plenums in February unfolded within two
distinct political spheres, and this reflects the generational differences in memory and national
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orientation espoused throughout the paper. As Randall Puljek-Shank and Felix Fritsch explain,
the protests–in addition to having a distinctly large youth demographic–were distinctly antipolitical. While they certainly voiced demands they also rejected interaction with political
figures, instead burning offices to the ground. This was based on the assumption that politics in
BiH are so irreconcilably corrupt that one cannot create reform within the existing system, as it
will immediately fall prey to rapacious individualism and, in the case of BiH, ethnic politics.79 In
contrast, the plenums that were opted for by the majority of the older generations (instead of
violence) reflected their experiences with violence in the 1990s, and were based around working
within the system to reform it. Particularly for the generation that came of age during the war,
avoiding a guiding ideology in the plenums was very important, as they were personally familiar
with the potentially disastrous consequences ideologies can have. They also reimagined the
structures of governance in a way that was distinctly reminiscent of Socialist Yugoslavia, with
governing bodies based on horizontal organization rather than hierarchies.80 While the plenums
were more prone to reimagining the existing structures of BiH–albeit fairly radically–many of
the demands still operated within the existing sphere of governance, and built off of the tried and
true Yugoslav system.81
The plenums and protests shared calls for institutional and constitutional change in BiH,
and were far from mutually exclusive of one other, both in terms of goals and demographics.
However, the youthful character of the protests and older character of the more tempered
plenums reflect the generational differences that characterize physical and discursive challenges
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to the status quo in Bosnia. An aversion to more violent forms of protest among the elder
generations demonstrates the potency of memory in BiH, particularly that of Yugoslavia’s
collapse. The violence that occurred mainly at the hands of young people highlights the
disconnect youth experience with regards to these memories, a critical aspect of the way youth
are actively reimagining the Bosnian state, community, and identity.
The protests brought very little significant structural change to post-Dayton Bosnia, at
least so far. While some politicians did resign, the ethnocracy has remained intact, the two
schools system still exists, and economic depression continues to plague the country. One could
perhaps say that the most profound accomplishment of the protests was the creation of a
movement with an “all-Bosnian and Herzegovinian character,”82 as Jasmin Mujanovic terms it,
as short lived as it may have been. Even still, as Garic-Humphrey points out, “since the February,
2014 uprisings, political elites are no longer able to disguise their capitalist policies and projects
under the pretext of the ethnonational interests of three constitutive peoples, which has been the
foundation of their divisive politics since the end of the war.”83 The protests laid bare on the
national level the inequalities and divisions that were already well known to citizens of BiH. In
contrast to the unconscious, invisible protesting evident in bathroom mixing, the 2014 protests
made the ever growing friction between youth and their ethnocratic rulers–as well as the failure
of the post-war Bosnian State–manifest. Whether Bosnians read about, watched, or took part in
the protests and plenums, they were forced to recognize and reconcile themselves–at least for a
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moment–with the absurdity of the state in which they live, and the very real problems it
perpetuates.
Activism exists in BiH beyond protesting. In fact, many organizations existed before the
protests–a reflection of growing friction between the ethnocracy and its citizens. Organizations
like OKC Abrasevic aim to bridge the gap between segregated youth communities via a common
cultural center, and have been doing so since 2008.84 Catering to the youngest generation, OKC
Abrasevic uses them as a starting point for crossing ethnic divisions. As elaborated on earlier in
this paper, youth have been finding their own ways of moving beyond the discursive limitations
and physical boundaries of ethnic politics in order to come together socially. The explicit
intention to restructure Bosnia’s constitutional and institutional foundations may not be the
driving force behind Croat and Bosniak teenagers smoking in a bathroom or meeting at a bridge
symbolic of division.85 However, the desire to cross (to them) considerably ungrounded ethnic
lines and know the proclaimed ‘other’ is. In looking at the protests, one can see that young
Bosnians are willing to come together to consciously challenge the status quo as well.
In summary, Bosnia’s current situation is an incredibly intricate one in which economic
depression and political paralysis stemming from a corrupt war-time transition to capitalism are
compounded by a social landscape characterized by rigid division along ethnic lines. This system
of segregation is maintained by memories of a bloody past marked by ethnic war, but primarily
by institutionalized ethnic-politics that frame separation as safety. As Mujanovic says, “you’re
never going to replace the Dayton constitution until you actually build movements that are
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capable of addressing the issues Dayton itself was first meant to address.”86 From this
perspective, significant structural change in BiH (i.e. doing away with the Dayton constitution)
means primarily addressing the ethnic rifts that keeps Bosnian society divided and virtually
powerless. Dayton was, before all else, a peace deal aimed at keeping Bosniaks, Croats, and
Serbs from war. As such, separation was deemed to be the most effective measure to ensure
armistice. This separation has promulgated a vicious cycle of political stagnation and economic
malaise, made seemingly insurmountable by the social divisions so deeply entrenched in the
fabric of Bosnian society.
The past is ever present in Bosnia and Herzegovina–its constitution the direct product
of the conflict and painful memories from which the country is purportedly transitioning. But
Bosnia is no longer the war torn land that it was when Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tujman, and
Alija Izetbegovic met at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio to sign the Peace
Accords in February 1995. Twenty-six years later however, Bosnia still suffers from an acute
case of ethnofactionalism that keeps alive the very sentiments that started the war in 1992.
However, youth pose a challenge to this dynamic. Despite having no direct connection to the
traumatic events of the 90s–events that birthed the modern Bosnian state–youth live their
consequences and legacy each day through the institutionalization of ethnic politics and ethnic
separation, as well as the grinding economic depression and political stagnation that pervade
daily life. They have grown up in a state defined by the vague idea of an internationally imposed
“transition,” which has failed to reconcile Bosnia’s troubled past. As such, the youngest
generations in Bosnia increasingly perceive their country to be one of absurdity, where the
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specter of a recent history defined by ethnic strife holds sway over all aspects of daily life, and
they struggle justify the existence of an ethnocratic regime whose legitimacy is based in memory
and division. This struggle is based in their disconnect with–yet entrapment by–the nationalized
memory of war that legitimizes segregation; and defined by movement beyond the traditional
discursive sphere of inter-ethnic relations and politics, as well as the conscious–and
unconscious–crossing of deeply entrenched ethnic divides. Consequently, the post-Yugoslav
generations are actively reimagining the Bosnian state, identity, and community, as well as the
constituent imagined Croat and Bosniak communities therein.
Naturally, not all young Bosnians are consciously or even unconsciously attempting to
cross ethnic lines. Some believe the status quo (i.e. division) to be best for Bosnia, and some are
outright radical nationalists. Some simply don’t care. As is always the case, the environment into
which Bosnian youth have been socialized over the last twenty-six years has affected each
individual differently, repelling some and satisfying others. However, it is critical to see the
efforts that have been made to bring Bosnian society closer together as a crucial form of dissent.
All too often does analysis of the Balkans fall into the same trap of the “Balkan myth,” in which
the diverse and complicated nations that comprise southeast Europe are imagined to be spaces of
inherent violence and instability, a supposed natural product of different peoples living in such
close proximity. The term “Balkanization” has even become commonplace in the English
lexicon, meaning the “division of a multinational state into smaller, ethnically homogenous
entities.”87 While violence has all too often plagued the region, in reality, the history of the
Balkans is marked by clumsy foreign occupation and international intervention, as well as
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neglect by an increasingly globalized world. Youth attempts (conscious or unconscious) to unify,
integrate, and constitutionally reshape Bosnia and Herzegovina today actively defy these myths,
and show BiH to be the complicated and dynamic place that it is. Like all other nations, it is part
of an ongoing history.
In many ways, the crisis of common national identity–where ethnic identity takes
precedence over the national one–fits into the larger history of Bosnia’s crisis of belonging. For
centuries, the region has been the home of ethnic Serbs, Croats, Albanians, and Muslims, all
living outside their respective “homelands.” Like the rest of the Balkans, they sometimes lived
together in peace, and sometimes not. Under Ottoman rule until 1878, then a subject of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire until the First World War, and later invaded by the Wehrmacht in 1941
and joined with the Nazi-backed Independent State of Croatia, Bosnia has never truly belonged
to one people. Throughout history it has been the subject of nationalistic debate between Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims seeking to realize expanded visions of their greater homelands, the
absorption of their ethnic kin in Bosnia being an integral part of these plans.88
In this sense, the First and Last Yugoslavs experienced a historical anomaly when the
federal Yugoslav identity superseded that of ethnonationality and religion. All “homelands” and
imagined communities were brought together under the Yugoslav flag, and lived in peace for
nearly half a century. The post-Yugoslavs, on the other hand, have grown up in a state that is in
many ways more emblematic of Bosnia’s history and the great question it has always faced: who
can truly call this land home? In the aftermath of the Bosnian War, this question has been
discursively mapped onto a polarizing spectrum of ethnic identity, victimhood, and memory, and
Edin Hajdarpasic, Dave Hall, and Jon Ulrich, Whose Bosnia? : Nationalism and Political
Imagination in the Balkans, 1840-1914, 1st ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 6-13.
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the post-Yugoslavs have been socialized into a society where this spectrum is ever present. As a
result, a new Bosnian question has emerged: who are Bosnians?
A longstanding goal of the IC’s activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to groom the
post-war state for EU membership. The supreme irony is that the conditions under which Bosnia
emerged as an independent state actually ensured very little self-governance, as well as the
perpetuation of the ethno-factionalism (both in terms of politics and geographically based
demographic homogeneity) that helped catalyze the Bosnian War in the first place. Democratic
change takes time, especially when ethnically aligned partisan politics are the status quo and
when the majority of the population still aligns themselves with an ethnic identity rather than that
of a collective national one.89 But, these obstacles are not insurmountable. The self-governing
city of Brcko, sandwiched between the Federation and Republika Srpska has proved to be a case
study in successful social and political ethnic-heterogeneity in Bosnia. A city of 100,000, Serbs,
Croats and Bosniak children study one curriculum in integrated classrooms. The mayor is a
Croat, his deputy is a Bosniak, and the assembly’s speaker is a Serb.90 Though it is not
completely free of the ethnic divisions and the shackles of memory that plague the rest of BiH,
Brcko is a compelling template for integration. If the 2014 protests said anything, it was that
Bosnians are tired of the status quo, old and young alike. As the generations born after the
Dayton Accords come of age–foreseeably encountering heightened agency and political
consciousness–Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs may all follow Faruk Salaka’s lead, and come
together under one Bosnian flag, and one collective Bosnian state, community, and identity.
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Ma#,
This is an intellectually rich and ethnographically mul7faceted examina7on of
na7onalism, ethnofac7onalism, memory and iden7ty in BiH. I appreciated your
sharp analysis and sophis7cated wri7ng and observa7ons. You’ve made several
enhancements for the ﬁnal draD (including the helpful discursive note on
imagined communi7es, among others). You look at the seam—or fracture line—
between the past, present and possible future in a land riven by divisions,
uncovering the will to cross borders (at least for the post Yugoslav genera7on)
as people move forward in 7me. This gives this historical project and
mul7layered, and meta, quality. It makes for an exci7ng and bold inves7ga7on,
even as we will, in a sense, need to wait to see how this history plays out.
Superb work.
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